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has recently taken place on compensation-related issues. As a set, these papers considerably expand our 
empirical evidence on the effects of compensation policies. Several papers show that executive 
compensation is structured in a way that at least implicitly ties executive compensation changes to 
measures of corporate performance, and —crucially—that doing so leads to improved corporate 
performance (Leonard, Murphy/Gibbons, Abowd). Others show that compensation systems that pay 
workers for performance, in the sense of providing explicit or implicit incentives for high levels of 
performance, can motivate individuals to increase their effort levels (Ehrenberg/Bognanno, Hamermesh, 
Asch, Kahn/Sherer). Still others show that high-wage policies do have some of the effects that 
proponents of efficiency wage theories claim for them (Krueger/Groshen, Holzer). Finally, one shows that 
profit-sharing plans appear, at least weakly, to increase employment stability (Chelius/Smith). 
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INTRODUCTION: 
DO COMPENSATION POLICIES MATTER? 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG* 
IT has been clear for some time that although various theories exist about 
why firms choose the compensation poli-
cies they do and what, the effects of these 
policies are likely to be, there is very little 
empirical evidence on whether compensa-
tion policies have their intended incentive 
effects at either the individual or corpo-
rate level.' The time was therefore ripe in 
1987 for a major interdisciplinary re-
search effort on this subject. Such an 
effort was made possible by the generous 
support of the Alfred P. Sloan Founda-
tion, including the support necessary to 
produce this volume. 
A group of leading academic econo-
mists, industrial relations researchers, and 
personnel and human resource scholars 
from around the country was assembled in 
1987 to conduct, individually and in 
teams, empirical research on compensa-
tion issues. A working conference of these 
researchers was held in Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, in November 1988 at the 
offices of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, which also provided 
supplementary financial support for the 
project. At this meeting, the researchers 
and a few invited guests debated the 
* Ronald Ekrenberg is Irving M, Ives Professor of 
Industrial and Labor Relations and Economics at 
Cornell University and Research Associate at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. He thanks 
John Abowd, Richard Freeman, and George Milko-
vich for serving as the Advisory Committee for the 
project that led to this volume, the Alfred P. Sloan 
foundation for providing financial support for the 
project and the publication of this volume, and 
Donald Cullen for comments on an early draft of this 
paper. 
This point is developed in Ehrenberg and 
Milkovich (1987). 
technical merits of preliminary versions of 
the researchers' papers. 
The project's final conference was held 
at Cornell University on May 23 through 
May 25, 1989. Attendance at this confer-
ence was limited to about 85 people, split 
roughly in thirds among project research-
ers, other (primarily young) academics 
doing research on the subject, and corpo-
rate executives who are at the forefront of 
compensation practices.2 The major goals 
of the conference were to give the 
corporate practitioners a sense of current 
academic research on this subject, to get 
from the practitioners a sense of the 
relevance of the research to them and 
their views on aspects of the subject in 
which new research is needed, and, most 
important, through the interaction of the 
researchers and the corporate profession-
als, to stimulate further research on 
compensation issues. It is fair to say that. 
all these goals were achieved. 
This volume is an attempt to convey to a 
broad audience the exciting empirical 
research that has recently taken place on 
compensation topics and to try to stimu-
late still further research on these topics. 
Included in the volume are revised ver-
sions of 13 of the 15 papers presented at 
the conference that referees felt war-
ranted publication in the Industrial and 
A list of conference participants appears in the 
appendix. I am grateful to both the academic 
discussants (Edward Lazear, Henry Farber, Katharine 
Abraham, Charles Brown, Daniel Hamermesh, and 
Barry Gerhart) and corporate discussants (Michael 
Guthman, Robert Ochsner, Robert Burg, Jean 
Badcrschneider, Stephen O'Byrne, Sharon Smith, 
and Ray Olsen) at the conference for their com-
ments, many of which led to substantial improve-
ments in the papers that appear here. 
Industrial and Ijibor Relations Review, Vol. 43, Special Issue (February 1990). €> bv Cornell University 
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Labor Relations Review. A paper on mana-
gerial pay and performance that was not 
presented at the conference, but that had 
been submitted to the Review and accepted 
for publication, is also included because it 
fits into the volume so well.3 Finally, a 
commissioned paper on data sets available 
to people interested in doing research on 
compensation issues is included to facili-
tate future research. 
Executive and Managerial 
Compensation and Performance 
The first three papers—one by Jonathan 
Leonard, one by Robert Gibbons and 
Kevin J. Murphy, and one by John 
Abowd—deal with the level and structure 
of executive and managerial compensa-
tion. Of key concern to the authors is 
whether executive and managerial compen-
sation changes are related to measures of 
corporate performance; two of the papers 
also address whether firms in which 
compensation changes have been closely 
related to performance have outper-
formed other firms. 
The Leonard and Abowd papers ana-
lyze compensation practices affecting over 
25,000 executives at a large number of 
major companies, using data that are 
collected annually by a major compensa-
tion consulting company. Leonard focuses 
on accounting measures of performance, 
whereas Abowd examines not only account-
ing measures (for example, net income/ 
assets) but also economic return on asset 
measures (such as return on equity) and 
financial or stock market-based measures 
(such as shareholder total return). Using 
different methodologies, both studies find 
weak evidence that firms that tie their 
executives' compensation changes to ac-
counting measures of performance tend 
to have better financial performance. 
Abowd finds stronger results for economic 
return on asset measures and market-
based performance. That is, he finds that 
firms that tie their executives' compensa-
tion to either of these two measures tend 
3
 Lawrence Kahn and Peter Sherer (this volume). 
to have better performance on that mea-
sure in the future. 
Gibbons and Murphy study the relation-
ship between the compensation of chief 
executive officers (CEOs) and stock mar-
ket measures of corporate performance, 
using a longitudinal sample of over 1,600 
CEOs in large publicly held corporations. 
The authors' theoretical analysis suggests 
that CEOs' compensation changes should 
be related to measures of corporate 
performance relative to some comparison 
group rather than to measures of absolute 
corporate performance. Empirically, they 
find that CEO compensation increases are 
in fact positively related to their corpora-
tions' relative financial performance and 
that the probability that a CEO leaves his 
corporation is negatively related to his 
corporation's relative financial perfor-
mance. In both cases, their evidence 
suggests that CEO performance is more 
likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate 
market measures than relative to industry 
measures of performance. 
In the discussion of this set of papers at 
the Cornell conference, it was pointed out 
that the definition of compensation used 
by all the authors excludes benefits and 
long-term incentives. Because these forms 
of compensation have become increasingly 
important under current tax laws, their 
omission from these studies is unfortu-
nate. Indeed, this omission may help 
explain why all the authors find relatively 
low elasticities of compensation changes 
with respect to performance. The authors 
were all well aware of this limitation in 
their data sets, and at least one author is 
currently working to value long-term 
incentives and include them in his compen-
sation measures. 
Do Pay Structures Have Incentive 
Effects at the Individual Level? 
Economists and compensation special-
ists often assume that pay policies can 
influence employee behavior and have 
desirable incentive effects. Yet, little em-
pirical testing by economists has been 
directed at whether incentive effects actu-
ally exist at the individual employee level. 
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The next four papers in the volume 
address this issue from very different 
perspectives. The paper by Michael Bog-
nanno and myself and that by Beth Asch 
deal with occupations that, at first glance, 
appear far removed from the corporate 
world, namely, professional golfers and 
military recruiters. In both situations, 
however, one can measure with precision 
both the incentive structure the individu-
als face and the output they produce. 
Thus, data from these occupations permit 
strong tests of whether pay structures 
have incentive effects at the individual 
level. 
Much attention has been devoted to 
studying models of tournaments or situa-
tions in which an individual's payment 
depends only on his or her output relative 
to that of other competitors.4 Under 
certain, assumptions tournaments are pos-
tulated to be a desirable way to structure 
compensation because of the incentive 
structure they provide. 
The Ehrenberg-Bognanno paper uses 
data from professional golf to investigate 
whether tournaments actually elicit de-
sired effort responses. The study focuses 
on golf because information on the incen-
tive structure (prize distribution) and 
measures of individual output (players' 
scores) are both available for golf. Under 
suitable assumptions, players' scores can 
be related to players' effort and inferences 
drawn as to how both players' overall 
tournament scores and their scores on the 
last round of a tournament should depend 
upon the level and structure of prizes. In 
addition, data are available to control for 
factors other than the incentive structure 
that should affect scores, such as player 
quality, the quality of the rest of the field, 
and the difficulty of the course. Using 
data from the 1987 European Men's 
Professional Golf Association Tour, the 
authors Find strong support for the prop-
osition that both the level and structure of 
prizes in PGA tournaments influenced 
players' performance. 
Asch examines how U.S. Navy recruit-
ers, who are assigned to recruiting duty 
4
 See, for example, Lazear and Rosen (1981). 
for three-year tours and whose output 
(the number and quality of recruits gener-
ated) is perfectly observed, respond to the 
compensation structure they face. Key 
components of this structure include the 
presence of recruitment station quotas, 
piece rates, and prizes that individual 
recruiters are eligible to win every 12 
months. Although her study focuses on 
military employees, Asch stresses its rele-
vance to private sector employees, such as 
production workers or sales persons who 
compete each year for prizes, nontenured 
college professors competing for tenure, 
and workers nearing retirement (that is, 
approaching the end of their "tours"). 
Analyzing data on recruiters in the 
Chicago area during a Five-month period 
in 1986, Asch finds that recruiters in-
crease their output in the months immedi-
ately prior to qualifying for a prize and 
decrease it in later months. Since prizes 
are based at least partially on the number 
of recruits generated, those who have 
performed poorly (produced few recruits) 
in the early part of the year produce more 
recruits, but generally of lower "quality" as 
measured by educational achievement and 
AFQT scores, in later months in an 
attempt to increase their chances of 
winning a prize. Finally, recruiters near 
the end of their tour who have little 
chance of winning a prize appear to 
reduce their work effort. This last finding 
suggests the need for employers to con-
sider ways to motivate employees who are 
nearing retirement. 
The third paper in this group, by 
Lawrence Kahn and Peter Sherer, ana-
lyzes data for a single company that 
employs workers in a number of different 
locations. Bonus pay policies for this 
company vary across locations, positions in 
the managerial hierarchy, and worker 
seniority levels. The authors first estimate 
the extent to which the relationship 
between bonuses and supervisors' subjec-
tive productivity ratings varies across these 
three dimensions and then test whether 
the improvement in an individual's rating 
over time is positively related to the 
steepness of the bonus-productivity sched-
ule he or she implicitly faces (that is, the 
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extent of bonus pay). They find that the 
steeper the bonus-productivity relation-
ship, the more an employee's rating 
improves over time. 
Finally, Daniel Hamermesh's paper fo-
cuses on a different type of incentive, 
namely, how the provision of "break time" 
(defined to include lunch breaks, coffee 
breaks, and other breaks) to workers 
affects their productivity per hour of work 
for which they are paid. He analyzes data 
collected by the University of Michigan 
Institute for Social Research in several 
household time use studies. Since informa-
tion on productivity is not available, he 
assumes that the earnings workers are 
paid is a reasonable proxy for their 
productivity. On average, he finds that 
providing workers with additional break 
time has no effect on their earnings, 
suggesting that further growth of on-
the-job leisure will not increase the produc-
tivity of most workers. On the other hand, 
additional break time does increase the 
productivity of the minority of workers 
with very short break times. 
Do High-Wage Policies Pay? 
Recently there has been extensive discus-
sion in the academic literature concerning 
why Firms might choose to be high-wage 
employers. Among the reasons suggested 
are increased ability to attract high-quality 
employees, increased ability to retain 
workers (lower turnover), increased work 
effort by workers and reduced shirking on 
the job by them (to reduce their chances of 
being fired from the high-paying jobs), 
and, because of the last reason, a reduced 
need for firms to closely supervise work-
ers. This discussion often goes under the 
rubric of "efficiency wage" theories.5 Sur-
prisingly, there is very little empirical 
evidence that firms pursuing high-wage 
strategies actually outperform other firms. 
Indeed, in contrast to his findings on the 
relationship between executive and mana-
gerial compensation changes and corpo-
rate performance, Leonard also finds in 
*See, for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1986). 
his paper in this volume that there is no 
correlation across firms between executive 
and managerial pay levels and accounting 
measures of performance. 
The next two papers in the volume use 
different data bases to investigate the 
question of whether "paying high wages 
pays." Erica Groshen and Alan Krueger 
use data drawn from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' 1985 Hospital Industry Wage Sur-
vey to study the trade-off between the 
wages paid to various occupational groups 
and the intensity with which staff workers 
are supervised. They find that hospitals 
that pay higher wages to staff nurses tend 
to employ fewer nurse supervisors; no 
similar trade-off between supervision and 
pay is found, however, for other hospital 
occupations. 
The authors' data do not permit them to 
determine whether the higher wages for 
staff nurses reduce the need for supervi-
sory nurses because higher-quality staff 
nurses are attracted or because staff 
nurses of average quality work harder. 
The authors also do not provide any 
analysis of whether the high-wage hospi-
tals have reduced costs of nursing services, 
because they cannot measure all of the 
benefits that the high-wage policies may 
bring (such as reduced turnover costs and 
higher-quality nurses). The direct cost 
saving (in terms of decreased supervisory 
costs) does, however, appear to be less 
than the increased costs of the higher 
wages for staff nurses. 
Harry Holzer uses data from the 1982 
wave of the national Employment Opportu-
nity Pilot Project survey of firms — 
specifically, data on starting salaries, worker 
characteristics, and job characteristics for a 
market that is predominantly comprised 
of workers with a high school education in 
clerical, sales, and service jobs. He finds 
that firms that pay higher wages spend 
fewer hours on informal training; their 
workers have longer current job tenure, 
more years of previous job experience, 
and higher subjective performance rat-
ings; and the firms have lower job vacancy 
rates and a higher perceived ease of hiring 
new employees. The magnitudes of these 
relationships, however, are quite sensitive 
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to the specific statistical models used. 
Using admittedly crude measures of the 
overall benefits and costs to the firm of 
paying higher wages, he finds that some, 
but not all, of the costs of higher wages are 
offset by reduced costs in other areas. 
Determinants of Firms' 
Compensation Policies 
Each of the papers discussed so far 
focuses on the effects of firms' compensa-
tion policies rather than on the reasons 
compensation policies vary across firms. 
For example, neither the Groshen-
Krueger paper nor the Holzer paper 
explains why some firms in their samples 
chose to pursue a high-wage policy while 
others chose to pursue a low-wage one. 
The next two papers are directed at 
exploring why compensation policies vary 
across firms and across establishments 
within a single firm. 
Charles Brown distinguishes among 
three types of pay-setting methods: piece 
rates, in which pay is "mechanically" 
linked to output; merit pay, in which 
subjective ratings by supervisors deter-
mine salary levels; and standard rates, in 
which pay depends upon a worker's 
seniority but not his or her performance. 
His theoretical discussion suggests that a 
firm's choice among these methods de-
pends on balancing the gains from more 
precise links between performance and 
pay against the costs of having to make 
precise or judgmental estimates of work-
ers' performance. 
Based upon this discussion, Brown 
hypothesizes that piece rates will be more 
common and merit pay less common in 
larger establishments; that the fewer the 
occupations in an establishment of a given 
size, the more likely it will adopt piece 
rates; and that work in which quality is 
easily verifiable is amenable to piece rates. 
Institutional considerations also suggest 
that standard rates should be more com-
mon in unionized establishments. Brown 
tests these and other hypotheses using 
both individual- and establishment-level 
data obtained from various governmental 
sources. His results are generally in line 
with his theoretical predictions. 
The importance of this paper for 
compensation research cannot be stressed 
enough. If pay policies are systematically 
chosen by firms, then analyses of the 
effects of pay policies cannot treat these 
policies as exogenous. Put another way, 
Brown's findings suggest that researchers 
must simultaneously analyze the causes 
and effects of pay policies. 
Casey Ichniowski and John Delaney's 
paper analyzes union contract data from a 
single large company in the retail food 
industry that operates in a national market 
but that bargains at the local or regional 
level with its unionized employees. Their 
interest is in the factors that are correlated 
with whether the company won a reduction 
in the average rate of total compensation 
in a contract negotiation. 
The authors find that unions were more 
likely to agree to concessions in situations 
in which accounting measures of store 
profits were low or negative. The largest 
concessions came from reductions in 
straight-time hourly earnings; the authors 
show, however, that a wide variety of 
provisions in the union contracts, not only 
wages, were changed to reduce costs. 
Finally, they show that wage concessions 
did serve to increase store profits on 
nearly a dollar-for-dollar basis. The last 
result implies that, at least in the short 
run, worker productivity was not seriously 
affected by the wage concessions. 
Do Compensation Policies Matter? 
The next two papers adopt novel (to 
many readers of the Industrial and Labor 
Relations Revieiv) approaches to analyze 
"whether compensation policies matter." 
The first addresses the question of whether 
financial markets act as if compensation 
policies matter by analyzing how stock 
market prices react to announced changes 
in compensation and other human re-
source policies. The second paper uses 
micro-simulation models to gain an under-
standing of the extent to which various 
"pay for performance" systems (such as 
bonuses and merit increases) are trans-
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lated into observed relationships between 
pay levels and productivity. 
John Abowd, George Milkovich, and 
John Hannon investigate whether public 
announcements of selected human re-
source management decisions, including 
those involving compensation and benefit 
increases and decreases, staffing changes, 
and relocations or shutdowns, have any 
effects on the stock market performance 
of major corporations. They use an event 
study methodology, borrowed from fi-
nance theory, that enables them to esti-
mate the effect of these announcements 
on the level and variability of abnormal 
total shareholder return (the movements 
in a corporation's stock market prices and 
dividends that cannot be predicted from 
what is happening to the stock market as a 
whole) around the announcement date. 
The authors find no consistent pattern 
of increased or decreased valuation of a 
company's stock in response to such 
announcements. They do find, however, 
an increased variation in abnormal total 
shareholder return in response to an-
nouncements of permanent staff reduc-
tions and shutdowns or relocations. Thus, 
announcements of such policy changes do 
provide information that influences stock 
market prices. 
Donald Schwab and Craig Olson's con-
tribution is the only one in the volume that 
does not analyze "real-world" data. Rather, 
using simulation techniques, they investi-
gate relationships between employee pay 
and performance produced under varying 
organizational practices among manage-
rial and professional employees just below 
the levels of those studied by Leonard, 
Gibbons and Murphy, and Abowd. They 
study these relationships both cross-
sectionally and longitudinally over ten 
time periods. 
Among the more interesting outcomes, 
Schwab and Olson find that, contrary to a 
common supposition, bonus systems are 
generally not superior to conventional 
merit systems in linking pay to perfor-
mance. They also find that error in the 
measurement of performance is not as 
serious a problem in pay-performance 
relationships as is typically believed. Their 
study is unusual for the methodology used 
and permits the authors to address several 
issues that have not been amenable to 
previous empirical research. 
Profit Sharing 
Group incentive plans, such as profit 
sharing or gain sharing, are of interest for 
at least two reasons. On the one hand, it is 
often postulated that they create incentive 
effects for workers that will lead to 
improved firm performance. On the other 
hand, some economists have argued that 
firms with profit-sharing plans will have 
compensation levels that are more flexible 
than other firms' compensation levels over 
a business cycle, and thus firms with 
profit-sharing plans should exhibit fewer 
layoffs and greater employment stability 
than firms without such plans.H 
The final research paper in the volume, 
that by James Chelius and Robert S. 
Smith, addresses the latter issue The 
authors analyze the effects of profit-
sharing on the employment of nonsuper-
visory workers in firms facing reduced 
demand using data from a special survey 
they conducted of small businesses and 
other data from a national sample of 
employees obtained from the 1977 Michi-
gan Quality of Employment Survey, The 
authors first use the employer data base to 
test whether profit sharing increases em-
ployment stability in the face of negative 
demand shocks and then use the em-
ployee data base to test whether it reduces 
layoff probabilities. In both cases, they 
find weak support for their hypotheses. 
Data Bases for Research or, 
Compensation Issues 
A major goal of this volume is to 
stimulate further research on compensa-
tion issues. To facilitate such research, the 
volume concludes with an annotated bibli-
ography prepared by Julie Hotchkiss of 
machine-readable data bases that are 
available to people interested in doing 
6
 See, for example, W'eit/.man (19840. 
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research on compensation issues. Each 
entry in this bibliography contains detailed 
information on a data base, including 
where it can be obtained and whom to 
contact for further information. Hotchkiss 
also includes information on several data 
bases that are not machine readable, 
usually collected either by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics or by private compensa-
tion consulting firms. 
Concluding Remarks 
The papers in this volume should give 
the reader a sense of the exciting empiri-
cal research that has recently taken place 
on compensation-related issues. As a set, 
these papers considerably expand our 
empirical evidence on the effects of 
compensation policies. Several papers show 
that executive compensation is structured 
in a way that at least implicitly ties 
executive compensation changes to mea-
sures of corporate performance, and — 
crucially—that doing so leads to improved 
corporate performance (Leonard, Murphy/ 
Gibbons, Abowd). Others show that com-
pensation systems that pay workers for 
performance, in the sense of providing 
explicit or implicit incentives for high 
levels of performance, can motivate indi-
viduals to increase their effort levels 
(Ehrenberg/Bognanno, Hamermesh, Asch, 
Kahn/Sherer). Still others show that high-
wage policies do have some of the effects 
that proponents of efficiency wage theo-
ries claim for them (Krueger/Groshen, 
Holzer). Finally, one shows that profit-
sharing plans appear, at least weakly, to 
increase employment stability (Chelius/ 
Smith). 
The papers also make important meth-
odological contributions. One shows that 
compensation policies are systematically 
chosen by firms and thus that analyses of 
the effects of pay policies cannot treat 
these policies as exogenous (Brown). Oth-
ers introduce to the readers of this volume 
two somewhat novel methodological ap-
proaches that can be used to study 
compensation-related issues, namely, event 
study methods borrowed from finance 
theory (Abowd/Milkovich/Hannon) and mi-
crosimulation methods (Schwab/Olson). 
Even a set of 14 research papers, 
however, can only begin to touch on the 
range of interesting issues in the field of 
compensation. Notably missing from this 
volume are discussions of how employee 
ownership, employee participation, profit-
sharing, and other group incentive plans 
(such as gain-sharing) can affect the 
performance of firms. Fortunately, the 
Brookings Institution recently commis-
sioned survey papers that deal with these 
topics, and these papers will shortly 
appear in published form.7 
Also missing from this volume is any 
mention of employee benefits, such as 
pensions, and the roles that the level and 
mix of benefits play in helping firms to 
attract, motivate, and retain workers and 
in helping firms to encourage older 
employees to either retire or stay on the 
job. Although much research has been 
done on these topics, this subject is likely 
to be of increasing importance as the 
proportions of older workers and women 
in the work force continue to expand. 
Increasingly, through voluntary corporate 
action, through collective bargaining, and 
through state and proposed federal legis-
lation, the growth of the proportion of 
women in the work force will lead to 
increased interest in family leave and child 
care policies. Research is clearly needed 
on the incentive effects of such policies 
and on what types and mixes of such 
policies are cost-effective. 
Similarly, none of the papers in this 
volume discusses the implications for 
compensation policies of the changing 
corporate environment in the United 
States, where fewer managers or employ-
ees can count on spending their entire 
careers with one firm than in the past. 
Some research has been conducted on 
how mergers and corporate acquisitions, 
including leveraged buy-outs, affect union 
and nonunion compensation and employ-
ment levels, but there have been no 
studies of how these restructurings will 
affect the set of compensation policies 
7
 Blinder (forthcoming). 
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firms should offer.8 For example, in a 
world in which the long-term attachment 
of workers to firms can no longer be 
presumed, does it still make sense for 
firms to offer their employees defined-
benefit pension plans based on final 
salaries? 
The papers in this volume should also 
give the reader a sense of the wide variety 
of data bases that can be used to conduct 
research on compensation. Several of the 
papers make use of corporate stock mar-
ket data or accounting performance data 
and merge these data with either data on 
executive or managerial compensation 
collected by Fortune Magazine and a com-
pensation consulting company or data on 
"human resource events" obtained from 
the Wall Street Journal (Abowd, Leonard, 
Murphy/Gibbons, and Abowd/Milkovich/ 
Hannon). Two other papers use data for 
specialized occupational groups (Ehren-
berg/Bognanno and Asch), and two use 
data from a single large corporation based 
on union contracts or corporate personnel 
records (Ichniowski/Delaney and Kahn/ 
Sherer). Two use Bureau of Labor Statis-
8
 See Brown and Mednff (1988), Lichtenbcrg and 
Siege! (1989), and Rosen (1989). 
tics data at the establishment level (Brown 
and Krueger/Groshen), three use survey 
data on firms or individuals collected by 
nongovernmental agencies for other pur-
poses (Hamermesh, Holzer, Chelius/ 
Smith), and one paper employs data from 
the authors' own survey (Chelius/Smith). 
Finally, the authors of one paper generate 
their data via microsimulation models 
(Schwab/Olson). Taken together, these 
papers suggest that a researcher's ability to 
study compensation issues is limited only 
by his or her ingenuity. 
Corporate participants at the Cornell 
conference encouraged researchers to be-
come more involved with the corporate 
world so that the researchers can learn the 
rapidly changing issues that corporate 
practitioners are confronting. Once these 
issues are known, the corporate partici-
pants stressed, there will be a need for 
more cooperation between economists and 
behavioral scientists in framing hypothe-
ses and research designs, and subse-
quently between these researchers and 
corporations to produce data bases that 
will both be of use to the researchers and 
aid in corporate decision-making. I hope 
that some readers of this volume will act 
on these considerations. 
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